

Message Text

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SUBJECT: SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH

REF: SECTO 1035

FOR LORD FROM THORNTON

FOLLOWING IS SONNENFELDT'S ORIGINAL SUBMISSION ON DETENTE
FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE BEEN CENTRAL TO

OUR SECURITY FOR THE PAST 30 YEARS. IN THE PERIOD AFTER

WORLD WAR II OUR CONCERNS FOCUSED MAINLY ON THE POSSIBILITY

THAT THE USSR, HAVING ABSORBED INTO ITS ORBIT THE ADJACENT

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NATIONS OF EASTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, MIGHT SEEK TO

SPREAD ITS CONTROL AND DOMINATION TO OTHER CONTIGUOUS

AREAS, BOTH IN EUROPE AND ASIA. OUR POLICIES IN THAT ERA THEREFORE CONCENTRATED BUILDING POSITIONS OF MILITARY STRENGTH FROM WHICH POTENTIAL SOVIET EXPANSION COULD BE RESISTED. THE "CONTAINMENT" DOCTRINE WHICH UNDERPINNED THESE POLICIES RESTED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT BY DAMMING IN SOVIET EXPANSIONIST DRIVES ON THE EURASIAN LANDMASS, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY ISOLATING THE USSR FROM THE EXTERNAL WORLD, TRANSFORMATIONS MIGHT OCCUR WITHIN SOVIET SOCIETY ITSELF THAT WOULD CURB EXPANSIONISM AND GRADUALLY CHANGE THE USSR INTO A LESS ANTAGONISTIC PARTICIPANT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. MEANWHILE, WITH THE HELP OF MAJOR AMERICAN EXERTIONS THE REGIONS AROUND THE USSR, ESPECIALLY IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE RESTORED TO VIGOR AND SELF-CONFIDENCE, REDUCING THE ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES, WHICH WERE THEN OPENLY THE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF SOVIET POLICY AND PATTERNED INTERNALLY ON THE MODEL OF THE SOVIET RULING PARTY.

THESE POLICIES SERVED US WELL, FOR THEY DID INDEED
LIMIT SOVIET EXPANSION TO THE AREAS ABSORBED IMMEDIATELY
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AFTER THE WAR (THOUGH THIS EXTENSION OF THE SOVIET TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM TO AREAS WITH WHICH WE HAD HISTORIC TIES CAUSED US MUCH ANGUISH); AND BEHIND THE SECURITY WALL THUS ERECTED, OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE WERE ABLE TO REBUILD THEIR VITALITY, CONFIDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

YET THE HOPE THAT THESE POLICIES WOULD PRODUCE A
PERMANENT OR AT LEAST EXTENDED STABILITY AND EVENTUALLY
GREATER NORMALITY WITH A GRADUALLY EVOLVING SOVIET UNION
WERE ONLY PARTLY FULFILLED. FOR, AT WORK IN THE SOVIET
UNION, AS IT HEALED ITS OWN WARTIME WOUNDS AND STEADILY
PUSHED AHEAD ITS ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND
INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, WERE FORCES THAT DROVE THE USSR INTO
A NEW PHASE OF ITS HISTORICAL EVOLUTION. GRADUALLY, WITH
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BY THE
PROCESSES OF DECOLONIZATION, THE SOVIET UNION BEGAN TO
EMERGE AS A POWER OF THE FIRST CLASS IN MILITANT TERMS,
AND BECAME VIGOROUS ACTOR ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE ON
A GLOBAL SCALE. IT ACQUIRED WEAPONS WHICH, FOR THE FIRST
TIME IN ITS HISTORY, ENABLED IT TO THREATEN DISTANT
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PLACES BEYOND THE EURASIAN LANDMASS, INCLUDING THE UNITED
STATES. IT BECAME A NAVAL POWER AND BEGAN TO ACQUIRE
THE HABITS OF THE GREAT NAVAL POWERS OF THE PAST IN
ATTEMPTING TO TRANSLATE THIS POWER INTO POLITICAL
INFLUENCE IN REGIONS NEVER BEFORE OF INTEREST TO CZARIST
OR BOLSHEVIK RUSSIA. DESPITE THE MANY FLAWS IN ITS
ECONOMIC SYSTEM, THE SOVIET UNION WAS PREPARED TO ALLOCATE
ECONOMIC RESOURCES FOR AID PROGRAMS PATTERNED ON THOSE
THEN USED BY OURSELVES AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS
IN ORDER TO EXPAND INFLUENCE AND APPEAL.
THE EARLY MANIFESTATIONS OF THIS NEW PHASE OF SOVIET

HISTORY OCCURRED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN
AFRICA AND ASIA AS ONE AFTER ANOTHER THE OLD COLONIAL
REGIONS CUT THEIR TIES TO THEIR TRADITIONAL METROPOLES.
YET EVEN THOUGH IT APPEARED IN THE MID-1950S, WHEN THE
FIRST DRAMATIC SOVIET INTRUSIONS INTO DISTANT REGIONS
TOOK PLACE, THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ALREADY A
FULL-FLEDGED IMPERIAL POWER, THE TREND WAS IN FACT MERELY
IN ITS EMBRYONIC STAGE AND WAS TO UNDERGO MANY SETBACKS
AND ADJUSTMENTS.

IN SOME RESPECTS, THE EXPECTATIONS THAT ACCOMPANIED
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THE INITIAL SOVIET LEAPS OVER THE BARRIERS OF CONTAINMENT
WERE EXAGGERATED. ALTHOUGH SOVIET INFLUENCE IN DISTANT
PLACES IS MORE EXTENSIVE THAN IT WAS EARLIER, SOVIET
DOMINATION AND CONTROL HAS ALMOST NOWHERE REACHED THE
LEVEL AND SCOPE PREVALENT IN THE SATELLITE EMPIRE OF THE
FIFTIES. SOVIET INSTITUTIONS, METHODS, DOCTRINES AND
CULTURAL PATTERNS HAVE GENERALLY PROVED LESS ATTRACTIVE
IN THE REGIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD THAN THE SEEMING
APPEALS OF MARXIST THOUGHT AND AUTHORITARIAN METHODS IN
MANY OF THOSE REGIONS WOULD HAVE SUGGESTED. THE SOVIET
MODEL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION,
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION HAS FOUND FEW IMITATORS
AND SUCH ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS AND ASSISTANCE AS THE USSR
HAS PROVIDED THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES HAVE ON THE
WHOLE HAD LITTLE IMPACT IN SHAPING THE EVOLUTION OF THOSE

COUNTRIES. ONE IMPORTANT REASON NO DOUBT IS THAT THE
SOVIET IMPERIAL IMPULSE OCCURS IN AN HISTORIC ERA IN
WHICH NATIONALIST IMPULSES AND YEARNINGS FOR IDENTITY
AND SELF-DETERMINATION ACT POWERFULLY TO LIMIT THE
CAPACITY OF EXTERNAL POWERS TO ASSERT CONTROL AND IMPOSE
PATTERNS OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT.
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YET SOVIET POWER CONTINUES TO GROW IN SEVERAL
DIMENSIONS; IN STRATEGIC MILITARY TERMS THE USSR HAS
ACHIEVED A BROAD EQUALITY WITH THE UNITED STATES AS WAS
PERHAPS INEVITABLE FOR A NATION WHOSE RULERS WERE
PREPARED TO GIVE "MILITARY SUPERIORITY" THE ABSOLUTE
TOP PRIORITY IN THE RESOURCES DEVOTED TO IT. FOR SOVIET
RUSSIA, THIS HAS MEANT THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN ITS
HISTORY IT CAN BRING TO BEAR FORCE AGAINST AREAS BEYOND
THE EURASIAN LANDMASS. AND THE CAPACITY TO DO SO BY
INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPONRY IS NOW REINFORCED BY THE
CAPACITY INHERENT IN NAVAL POWER TO DISPLAY PRESENCE
AND EXERT OTHER FORMS OF INFLUENCE AT GREAT DISTANCES.
WITH NO PART OF THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE REACH OF ITS
MILITARY FORCES, THE USSR HAS BEGUN TO DEFINE ITS INTERESTS
AND OBJECTIVES IN GLOBAL TERMS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
RUSSIAN HISTORY. IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS
EVOLUTION IS NOW ROOTED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN REAL POWER
AND IS NOT SIMPLY A MANIFESTATION OF A UNIVERSALIST
DOCTRINE WHICH, AS NOTED ABOVE, IN FACT HAS VERY LITTLE

UNIVERSAL VALIDITY OR APPEAL.

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THUS, THE UNITED STATES AND INDEED THE WORLD AT LARGE
IS NOW CONFRONTED WITH THE EMERGENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION
AS A SUPERPOWER ON A WORLD SCALE, A PROCESS THAT IS
LIKELY TO BE WITH US FOR A GENERATION OR MORE. HOW TO
COPE WITH THIS, HOW TO MANAGE ITS EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS
IS THE CENTRAL SECURITY PROBLEM WE HAVE FACED FOR THE
LAST SEVERAL YEARS AND WILL HAVE TO FACE WHOEVER HOLDS
RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR LEADERSHIP NEXT YEAR AND FOR YEARS
THEREAFTER.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW POWERS INTO AN EXISTING STRUC-
TURE OF POWER IS NOT NEW IN HISTORY. IT IS INDEED A
RECURRENT PHENOMENON THAT GOES BACK AS FAR AS RECORDED
HISTORY. BUT HISTORICALLY THE MANNER IN WHICH AN EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL ORDER ADJUSTED TO THE ARRIVAL OF ONE OR
MORE NEW ACTORS ALMOST INVARIABLY INCLUDED THE USE OF
FORCE -- BE IT TO REMOVE OR IMPEDE THE UPSTART, OR TO
REMOVE OR DIMINISH SOME OF THE PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED
ACTORS, OR TO FIND SOME MODUS VIVENDI IN A REVISED
SYSTEM. BUT IN THE NUCLEAR

THE USE OF FORCE, OF OPEN WARFARE, TO COPE WITH
EMERGENCE OF A NEW POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTEL-

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LATION OF POWER INVOLVES RISKS OF UTTER CATASTROPHE.

IT IS THE TASK OF MODERN STATECRAFT -- THE HISTORIC
CHALLENGE POSED FOR IT -- ON ALL SIDES, TO MAKE THE
TRADITIONAL ADJUSTMENTS OF POWER IN THE WORLD WITHOUT
RECOURSE TO ULTIMATE USES OF FORCE. THIS IS THE PROBLEM
OF DETENTE, RATHER THAN THE ALLEGED HUNGER FOR
RELAXED TENSIONS AND AGREEMENTS AT ANY PRICE, AND FOR
GOOD FEELINGS WHICH THE CARICATURISTS OF OUR POLICIES
HAVE PICTURED. IT IS A PROBLEM WE CANNOT EVADE EITHER
BY DENYING ITS EXISTENCE OR BY SIMPLY GIVING VOICE
TO OUR SENSE OF REPUGNANCE FOR THE SOVIET INTERNAL
SYSTEM. NOR CAN WE DEAL WITH IT BY SIMPLY ATTEMPTING
TO CONFRONT SOVIET POWER WITH AMERICAN POWER, THOUGH
OUR OWN POWER MUST REMAIN STRONG AND VIGOROUS. NOR
CAN WE DEAL WITH IT BY THE OLD POLICIES OF OSTRACISM
AND ISOLATION SINCE EVEN IF WE WERE TO IGNORE THE
REALITIES OF SOVIET POWER, THAT POWER WOULD STILL
AFFECT US AND OUR ALLIES AND OTHERS, WHOSE INDEPENDENCE
IS OF CRUCIAL INTEREST TO US.

THE POLICIES PURSUED BY THIS ADMINISTRATION AND
ITS PREDECESSOR HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO BUILD A SET OF
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RELATIONSHIPS IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WILL, EQUALLY,
BE CONSCIOUS OF THE RISKS AND PENALTIES OF THE
ABSENCE OF RESTRAINT. THIS IS A LONG-TERM POLICY
WHOSE SUCCESS CANNOT READILY BE MEASURED ON A WEEKLY,
MONTHLY OR ANNUAL BASIS. BUT IT IS A POLICY BASED

IN THE FIRST INSTANCE ON THE FACT THAT WE, OUR
ALLIES AND OTHERS POSSESS GREAT STRENGTHS OF OUR OWN
AND THAT IT IS THUS FAR FROM PREORDAINED THAT SOVIET
POWER WILL COME TO BE DOMINANT IN THE WORLD. REGRET-
TABLY, FAR TOO MANY OF US ARE STILL UNDER THE SPELL OF
THE STALINIST MYTH THAT THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD HISTORY
WILL IN FACT FOLLOW THE LAWS THAT MARXIST-LENINISTS
CLAIMED TO HAVE DISCOVERED, BUT WHICH IN PRACTICE HAVE
PROVED TO BE ANYTHING BUT LAWS OR EVEN MODERATELY
ACCURATE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE HUMAN CONDITION.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS EQUALLY A FACT THAT SOVIET
POWER ALTHOUGH IN PROCESS OF CONTINUED GROWTH AND GLOBAL
EMERGENCE IS ALSO EVOLVING WITH CONSIDERABLE UNEVEN-
NESS. SOVIET SOCIETY IS NO LONGER IMPERMEABLE AND
WHILE ITS RIGIDITY AND ESSENTIAL CONSERVATISM IS IN

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ONE SENSE AN ASSET FOR A NATION SEEKING "ITS PLACE
IN THE SUN," IT IS ALSO A BRAKE ON GROWTH OF THE USSR
INTO A MODERN, TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED AND
INNOVATIVE SOCIETY. IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE
SOVIET ECONOMY, WHILE CAPABLE OF ENORMOUS FEATS OF
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PROVIDING THE BASE OF A POWER-
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PROVIDING THE BASE OF A POWER-
FUL MILITARY APPARATUS IS NOT ABLE, WITH ITS OWN RE-
SOURCES, TO BRING ABOUT THE MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA
TO THE LEVEL OF OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES.

YET THIS IS PRECISELY AMONG THE ASPIRATIONS OF SOVIET
LEADERS AND ELITES.

THUS THE COMBINATION OF OUR OWN STRENGTHS, AND
THOSE OF THE REST OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD, ON THE ONE
HAND, AND ON THE OTHER THE VULNERABILITIES, SHORT-
COMINGS AND REQUIREMENTS FROM THE EXTERNAL WORLD
OF THE USSR PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM POLICY
OF INFLUENCING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE USSR EMERGES
AS A WORLD POWER. WE HAVE APPROACHED THE FORMULATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE POLICIES BY SETTING
FORTH THE GOALS OF RESPONSIBLE RELATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR
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AGE; RESPECT FOR THE INTERESTS OF ALL, RESTRAINT IN
THE USES OF POWER AND ABSTENTION FROM EFFORTS TO
SEEK UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS.
WE HAVE NEGOTIATED A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD
SEEK TO BUTTRESS THESE GOALS, INCLUDING IN THE AREA
OF ARMS CONTROL AND ON METHODS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT.
IN ADDITION WE BEGAN SOME YEARS AGO TO ESTABLISH A
NETWORK OF COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A GREAT VARIETY
OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS -- ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL,
-
ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHERS -- FROM WHICH CAN FLOW CONCRETE
BENEFITS IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE POWER IS USED WITH
RESTRAINT AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE INTEREST OF
OTHERS. THE EFFECTS ON POLITICAL CONDUCT OF SUCH A

NETWORK OF AGREEMENTS AND OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF VESTED
INTERESTS IN THEIR MAINTENANCE CAN BE MEASURED ONLY
OVER A SOMEWHAT EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. FOR IT IS
ONLY WHEN A DEGREE OF INTERDEPENDENCE HAS
COME INTO EXISTENCE THAT STATESMEN AND SOCIETIES WILL BE
COME INTO EXISTENCE THAT STATESMEN AND SOCIETIES WILL BE
CONSCIOUS OF WHAT THE LOSS OF THE ACQUIRED BENEFITS MIGHT
MEAN TO THEM AND THEN LEADERS CANNOT AVOID INCLUDING SUCH
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RISKS AND PENALTIES IN THEIR CALCULATIONS AS THEY CONTEM-
PLATE THIS OR THAT ACTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE.
REGRETABLELY, THE RATHER PROMISING BEGINNINGS THAT WERE
MADE IN THE EARLY SEVENTIES IN DEVELOPING THE BEGINNINGS
OF A STRUCTURE OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND INTERDEPENDENCES
HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY SLOWED DOWN BY OUR INABILITY TO
PROCEED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC TIES
WITH THE USSR AND BY THE WHOLLY FALSE CHARACTERIZATION
OF THESE POLICIES AS "GIVE-AWAYS" AND "ONE-WAY STREETS".
I SHOULD ADD IN THIS REGARD, THAT IN THE PRESENT WORLD,
TRADE WITH THE USSR WILL GO FORWARD WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR
NOT. OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS ENGAGE IN IT AND, UN-
LESS WE WANTED TO INSTITUTE EXPORT AND IMPORT CONTROLS, SO
DO OUR OWN FIRMS. THE QUESTION IS: IS THIS ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY GOING TO BE HARNESSSED TO THE LONG-TERM PURPOSE OF
COPING WITH THE EMERGENCE OF THE USSR AS A WORLD POWER,
OR IS THE USSR GOING TO DETERMINE THE TERMS OF ECONOMIC

CONTACT ALONE, WHILE OUR FIRMS ACT ON PERFECTLY VALID

DESIRES FOR PROFIT WHICH, DO NOT, HOWEVER, NECESSARILY

SUPPORT A LONG-TERM OVERALL STRATEGY OF RELATIONS WITH THE

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USSR. BY LINKING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE--ITSELF A MATTER

OF DEEP AND LEGITIMATE CONCERN--AND BY PUTTING THE SOVIET

UNION IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT IN DETERMINING THE NATURE AND

MAGNITUDE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS OUR CONGRESS HAS

DENIED US IMPORTANT INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR PURSUING A LONG-

TERM STRATEGY VIS-A-VIS THE USSR. AND IT HAS DONE NOTHING

FOR THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

I STRESS THIS ISSUE NOT BECAUSE WE HAVE THE ILLUSION

THAT TRADE AND PROLIFERATING ECONOMIC CONTACTS HAVE THE

MAIN ROLE IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET POWER.

THEY ARE BUT ONE ASPECT OF THIS POLICY. I STRESS IT

BECAUSE IT ILLUSTRATES THE UNAVOIDABLE CIRCUMSTANCE THAT

WE MUST DESIGN OUR POLICIES FOR THE LONG RUN, BUILD UP

THE INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR THEIR CONDUCT, MAKE REALISTIC

USE OF OUR ASSETS AND UTILIZE ALL THE AVAILABLE OPPORTUNI-

TIES FOR AFFECTING SOVIET BEHAVIOR STEMMING FROM THE VERY

NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM ITSELF.

IN SUM, DETENTE IS THE PROBLEM OF HOW THE SOVIET UNION

IS TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, WHICH IS

ITSELF IN ENORMOUS FLUX, WITHOUT A CATASTROPHIC WAR AND

WHILE OUR INTERESTS AND VALUES AND THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS

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AND OTHERS ARE PROTECTED. THIS IS THUS NOT A PROBLEM FOR
THE US ALONE. LITERALLY ALL NATIONS, CERTAINLY THOSE IN
REGIONS CLOSE TO THE USSR, BUT OTHERS AT GREATER DISTANCE
AS WELL, HAVE AN INTEREST IN SEEING SOVIET POWER BALANCED.
NO COUNTRY, EVEN THOSE WHO ENJOY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE
USSR, HAVE AN INTEREST IN SOVIET POWER BECOMING DOMINANT
EITHER REGIONALLY OR, EVEN LESS, GLOBALLY. WE HAPPEN TO
HAVE THE PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MEANS TO BALANCE
THE STRATEGIC POWER OF THE USSR IN THE PRESENT PERIOD; AND
WE CLEARLY HAVE AN INTEREST AND RESPONSIBILITY IN HELPING
TO BALANCE SOVIET REGIONAL POWER IN SUCH KEY AREAS AS
EUROPE. BUT OTHERS MUST SHARE THE EFFORT, AS THEY MUST
ALSO IN THE DEVISING OF MEANS THAT OVER TIME WILL MAKE
THE ADVANTAGES OF RESTRAINT SO SUBSTANTIAL THAT THE
PROSPECT OF THEIR LOSS WILL SERVE TO REINFORCE THE IMPULSES
AND HABITS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE USE OF POWER. SISCO
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